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Let me offer the main conclusions of this paper. First, we emphasize that risk and its 
consequences should not be viewed as a ‘temporary’ problem, something that is just 
part  of  life,  but  in  fact  has  long  term  and  cumulative  implications  for  the  poor. 
Secondly, these long-term implications can also be viewed in terms of the activities 
people can enter into and the earnings they can obtain: as such, risk has implications 
for growth of substantial parts of the population. It is therefore important to start 
integrating risk not just in the analysis of poverty but also of growth. Risk forces 
people to disengage from profitable activities. The evidence is suggestive for crucial 
impacts on pro-poor growth: pro-poor growth policies need to have a specific space 
for .  This lack of participation has nothing to do with ‘preferences’ or ‘attitudes’ by 
the poor towards risk: they are relate to the fundamental failure of markets and policy 
to offer credible protection against risk. As this informs us about a possibly important 
barrier to the participation of the poor in growth, pro-poor growth interventions need 
to take this seriously. But making these points to enter the consciousness of the policy 
makers, we need to build up further the evidence base. The most central gap is the 
link between micro-level analysis and the macroeconomic and growth implications.   
 
 
This conclusions follow from the underlying view in this note is that risk is a cause of 
poverty, affecting growth and the extent to which the poor can take part. This implies 
that social protection activities can have very substantial economic and social returns. 
But we need to be cautious with this: the evidence base is growing but it is still very 
limited, and for this view to gain more broad acceptance, this evidence must be clear, 
convincing and transparent. This work could be done using the (at times berated) 
technique of cross-country comparisons, focusing on developing countries and the 
risks they face. This work should be done using panel data, to deepen the knowledge 
base on links between risk and poverty processes, supplemented by careful contextual 
evidence. We should do some experimenting with policy instruments – evaluating 
them, possibly using randomised trials. And we should not avoid the more difficult 
institutional questions, such as the scaling up of interventions. 
 
But one should be clear from the onset that the aim of this paper is not to give a 
comprehensive summary of the issues related to risk, growth and poverty. The stock 
taking in this paper is done largely in order to ask some (at times difficult) questions 
                                                
2 This is note was first drafted as a background note for work on Risk and Growth, funded by the DFID 
via the World Bank. It benefited from inputs by Valerie Kozel, Matthew Greenslade, Jillian Popkins 
and  Robert  Holzmann  and  participants  at  a  workshop  in  Leuven,  June  2005,  as  well  as  other 
background notes and presentations by Alain de Janvry and Elizabeth Sadoulet, Adeel Malik, Michael 
Carter and Chris Barrett, and Chris Elbers and Jan Willem Gunning. All errors are obviously mine. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 3 
 
for future work. Although there is overlap, one is encouraged to look at related papers 
such as Gunning and Elbers (2005) or Barrett and Carter (2005)). More specifically, 
in the terms of the available, and some its direct implications for policy, the reader is 
encouraged to revisit Dercon (2005).  Section 2.4 in the current paper draws heavily 
on that paper as well. 
 
To put the discussion into context, a first section will introduce the way poverty and 
growth, and risk are typically treated as distinct issues in theoretical, empirical and 
policy analysis. To do so, I first give a brief impressionist view of the current policy 
discourse  of  poverty  and  growth.  Then,  I  will  briefly  discuss  where  risk  is  (not) 
entering  in  standard  analysis.  The  next  section  will  then  discuss  a  simple 
microeconomic framework, discuss sources of risk and the micro-evidence on the link 
between risk and poverty. We also ask whether we are identifying risk correctly and 
discuss the problems with identifying the impact of risk. Section 3 aims to see how 
this evidence can be moved to the macro-level – to growth. I will first discuss whether 
the micro-evidence is enough to construct a growth argument. I will also spell out the 
link between risk and poverty traps. Finally, we will identify some issues of research 
at the macro-level and subsequently the micro-level work that could be expanded (or 
at least some issues identified). The final section will then raise some problems with 
translating this evidence into a broad policy conclusion for public action, as part of a 
conclusion.  
 
1. Poverty, growth and risk: some introductory remarks 
 
1.1 An impressionist view of the policy discourse on poverty and growth 
 
Most of the current policy analysis and advice on poverty focuses on stimulating 
broad-based growth, as a means of achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Much of this analysis – and the debate on the relative importance of factors - 
appears (when translated into the economists’ lens) to come down to some simple 
growth accounting framework, spiced up with some basic ideas from classical and 
modern growth theory.  
 
The  focus  on  how  to  achieve  these  goals  tends  to  drift  around  some  of  the 
fundamental  processes  of  accumulation:  achieving  growth  in  the  capital  stock 
(focusing  on  investment,  investment  climate  and  the  complementarities  from 
infrastructure,  public  goods)  and  growth  in  the  human  capital  stock  (broad  based 
education, and somewhat more recently, health). To achieve a sufficient impact on the 
MDGs, the concerns of distribution and inequality have been moved back onto the 
agenda (this time largely for its instrumental value, not its intrinsic value – see the 
latest WDR on inequality). The underlying parameters of the relevant relationships 
describing both the growth and poverty reduction relationships (TFP growth, poverty-
growth  elasticities,  and  all  the  underlying  instrumental  relationships)  are,  in  the 
current discourse, mediated by the broad spectrum of issues, often summarised as 
‘policies’  versus  ‘institutions’. Much of the debate then focuses on  whether these 
factors are internal to LDCs versus international, and whether it is the institutional 
side  or  the  ‘policy’  side  that  dominates.    The  main  protagonists  in  this  debate, 
including  recipient  LDC  governments,  bilateral  and  international  agencies, 
multinational NGOs and the recent emergence of populist advocacy specialists take 
sides on these factors, with good and sometimes not very good evidence. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 4 
 
 
The economics underlying this is, most of the time, obviously not very sophisticated: 
it is basic growth  theory, mixed with simple trade theory, often devoid of strong 
micro-foundations and evidence. Poverty relationships are based on simple views of 
the functional distribution of incomes (e.g. the poor only have labour, and limited 
skills and education, while the rich have more education and also capital). It works 
nevertheless  reasonably  well  to  understand  what  is  going  on.  Growth  requires  a 
situation where there are opportunities and where people are willing to invest: to part 
with funds they have today to get more later on. Taking advantage of opportunities 
requires, beyond the means to invest, some skills, some complementary inputs and an 
environment  where  the  profits  of  one’s  effort  cannot  be  expropriated.  Sharing  in 
growth  by  relatively  poorer  people  involves  access  to  the  endowments  or  assets 
necessary to take part in this process – access to skills, health, credit - and the ‘social’ 
possibility to share in wealth creation and the social and physical infrastructure in the 
society, suggesting issues of empowerment.   
 
The macro-growth thinking behind this is well  beyond the simple microeconomic 
general equilibrium framework with complete markets. It strikes me, however, that 
the foundations for the policies towards the poor are still largely based on a variation 
of the so-called “second welfare theorem”
3, whereby simple redistribution is being 
replaced with something more sophisticated, at least in political economy terms, with 
a  focus  on  educational  and  health  asset  accumulation,  and  voice  and  democracy 
issues. I should stress that there is intrinsically nothing wrong with this – and nothing 
in the note wants to argue against this.  
 
There are however two, possibly linked, issues that are worth considering that are 
fundamentally missing in this framework. First, once it is recognised that this perfect 
competitive  world  is  an  illusion  and  at  least  some  market  imperfections  are 
fundamentally difficult to overcome, then there may be processes of low growth, even 
growth  traps  and  poverty  traps  that  are  poorly  understood  in  this  framework. 
Secondly, risk is dismally treated in this framework, and we are only recently started 
to address its implications, not least in a world with other imperfections to markets 
and where ‘traps’ become plausible. Taken together, this suggests that by introducing 
risk more properly into the analysis, we could focus on two related issues: first, that 
risk  may  well  be  crucial  limiting  factor  for  ‘growth’  especially  in  the  high  risk 
environments characterising many poor developing countries, and that risk may well 
have important implications for the extent to which poverty is reduced in the face of 
growth, since the poor, in their endeavour to have a relatively secure existence take 




                                                
3 A reminder: the first welfare theorem suggests that competitive markets result in equilibrium in a 
‘pareto’ efficient allocation, so that no-one can be made better off without at least one person being 
made worse off. The second welfare theorem states that every pareto efficient allocation in an economy 
can be obtained for a particular, given distribution of endowments. In short, efficiency can be obtained 
after first allocating endowments in any way a ‘social planner’ – akin to Plato’s philosopher-king – 
may  find  socially  optimal.  Markets  do  not  have  to  become  ‘distorted’  even  if  one  cares  about 
distribution. The corollary is that distorting markets for fairness reasons has to result in efficiency 
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2. 2. The problem of risk in the economic and policy literature 
 
“Risk”  features  only  peripherally  in  most  of  the  economic  diagnosis  and  policy 
discourse related to the MDGs. It is rarely central to the discussions of growth and 
poverty. It is viewed as a source of ‘temporary’ problems, that one may want to solve, 
but is not a cause of ‘permanent’ low GDP, low growth or high poverty. Designing 
policies to help with risk is then almost a luxury, to be considered after some more 
basic and essential problems have been resolved. 
 
In  most  macro-growth  analysis,  risk  is  just  a  nuisance  parameter  –  noise  to  the 
econometrician, and unspecified randomness in theory modelling. In most empirical 
growth  models,  risk  enters  in  the  error  term,  i.e.  as  a  stationary  shifter  of  the 
efficiency parameter. This means that risk nor shocks have permanent or persistent 
effects. Any impact will only be transitory, and ‘natural’ processes will in the long-
run resolve them.  
 
In empirical analysis, there is some work that enters descriptions of ‘shocks’ (Easterly 
et al., Rodrik, Aghion et al., 2005), and at least one obvious attempt of entering ‘risk’ 
in empirical cross-country growth analysis. Risk is here defined as commodity price 
risk (Ramey and Ramey, 1992). But otherwise it is largely lacking, d despite the fact 
that risk is one of the defining characteristics of the investment, capital accumulation 
and growth problem. The emerging literature on ‘volatility and growth’, while taking 
a rather different focus, and tends to be biased toward middle- and rich economies, 
may bring some elements relevant. Furthermore, its emphasis on ‘ex-post’ volatility 
(such as using the standard error of growth over relatively short periods of time as the 
relevant indicator) is not clearly or easily translated in a framework of ‘ex-ante’ risk.   
 
When focusing on welfare, risk is seen as a source of ‘temporary’, or ‘transitory’ 
poverty: a source of misfortune, pushing some people below a socially accepted norm 
temporarily.  This  view  is  prevalent  in  the  macroeconomic  literature,  or  more 
precisely, the literature on the welfare implications of macroeconomic crisis and its 
responses in the form of economic reform. Important economic shocks, such as a 
sudden  exchange  rate  depreciation  or  (policy-driven)  devaluation,  have  important 
welfare implications, in the form of losers and gainers. If its welfare implications are 
discussed,  these  consequences  are  defined  as  ‘temporary’  shocks,  requiring  some 
‘safety nets’.  
 
Similarly,  in  the  more  microeconomic  literature,  risk  is  also  typically  treated  as 
causing ‘temporary’ or ‘transitory’ effects. To illustrate this consider the following. A 
standard way of assessing the implications of risk in micro-data contexts is to measure 
the consumption or nutrition losses linked to different shocks, such as rainfall, illness, 
pests, etc. Essentially, outcome variables are correlated with shocks in a multivariate 
context, and the contribution to the latter can be quantified.  For example, in Ethiopia, 
we recently calculated that shocks between 1999 and 2004 can ‘explain’ about a third 
of the poverty levels in 2004 – i.e. that a third of the poor would not have been below 
the poverty line in 2004 had sufficient protection existed so no impact of shocks had 
to be felt and they could have been allowed to keep consumption ‘smooth’. This is 
another way of stating that ‘a third of poverty is transitory’. 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 6 
 
But  this  type  of  analysis  –  still  much  in  vogue,  and  unfortunately  including  in 
relatively widespread ‘risk and vulnerability analysis’ – is moving risk again to the 
periphery of the poverty discourse. The reason is simple: two-thirds of the calculated 
poverty in 2004 would still have existed even if there had been normal rains, no-one 
in the family had been ill and no pests had affected crops. These two-thirds are then 
clearly more permanently poor. This ‘core’ of the poverty problem are the ‘chronic 
poor’,  to  put  it  simply,  those  below  the  norm  in  good  and  in  bad  years.  The 
counterfactual calculations on Ethiopia would also suggest that  the chronic poor are a 
more substantial group anyway: 66 percent of the poor! As a result, prioritizing these 
‘chronic poor’ may be a more appropriate strategy. 
 
Of course, this view contains an important fallacy: by treating risk as fundamentally 
just being the ‘shocks’ in a (stationary or unchanging) consumption or other outcome 
process, it assumes that even if households cannot cope in the period of the shock, this 
has  no  implications  in  the  long-run.  This  ignores  the  ‘ex-post’  consequences  of 
shocks,  in  terms  of  destruction  of  assets,  human  capital  and  social  institutions. 
Furthermore, it ignores the sophisticated risk management strategies employed by the 
poor to reduce risk exposure and its consequences, which are partially effective but in 
the end force risk to be traded for lower returns: profitable opportunities have to be 
avoided – the ‘ex-ante’ consequence of risk. These ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ costs of 
risk are the two fundamental pillars of the view that risk is a cause of poverty and 
needs to be put more at the core of the poverty reduction debate and the MDGs. 
Details of this view is developed in Dercon (2005). The conceptual and theoretical 
arguments are not repeated here; the rest of this paper focuses rather on outstanding 
issues, not on a comprehensive review of concepts and evidence. 
 
The lack of risk at the centre of the discourse is striking six years after the 2000/01 
World  Development  Report  on  Poverty,  which  had  three  pillars:  opportunities, 
empowerment and ‘security’. The latter was meant to include a substantial focus on 
risk and related vulnerability. This has already two crucial implications for research: 
first, find a way to get those researchers working on ‘growth’ issues to take risk more 
seriously. While one may be deeply sceptical about cross-country growth regressions, 
there must be ways of getting these dimensions better covered in this type of analysis. 
Below I give a few suggestions. Secondly, the modelling of the link between poverty 
and  risk,  already  an  active  area,  needs  to  be  expanded.  Many  (including  other 
background notes) make excellent suggestions. I will add a few more below. 
 
2. Risk and Poverty: inference from microeconomic analysis 
 
2.1. Getting the questions right: a conceptual framework 
 
At the risk of stating the obvious, when launching further work on risk, growth and 
poverty, whether at the micro and macro-level, it is instructive to place this work in 
the simple framework below (table 1). Households, firms – or societies as a whole, 
face a multitude of risk, and given their options and characteristics, they will make 
risk  management  decisions,  or  at  least  decisions  with  implications  for  risk 
management. This decision-making ‘ex-ante’ has implications for outcomes, in terms 
of  levels  and  growth,  in  the  short  run  and  long  run.  Next,  shocks  may  occur  – 
effectively a realisation of the state of the world whose risk may or may not have been 
recognised beforehand.  People’s responses or inability to respond again will have QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 7 
 
implications for outcomes in terms of levels and growth, in the short run and in the 
long run. 
 
Not all research will articulate all these dimensions. For example, when studying the 
long term consequence of a serious drought, via a focus on the evolution of assets, 
limited attention is likely to be paid to the underlying risk management decisions and 
other risks faced. But it is instructive to cross-check where different questions are 
addressed. Not least: avoiding the confusion that analysis is about ‘shocks’ compared 
to ‘risk’ would be helpful. Below, we will use this table loosely to identify some 
outstanding issues. 
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At this stage, it is helpful to get one crucial fallacy out of the way. It is sometimes 
suggested that risk is problem for some families or firms because of risk aversion. 
Those that take risks are less risk averse and ‘entrepreneurial’, it is suggested, and 
therefore their decisions result in lower earnings in the long run. If people were less 
risk  averse,  risk  would  not  be  a  problem:  risk  is  just  a  matter  of  choice,  and 
preferences drive the entire outcome. The fallacy in this reasoning is that risk is only a 
problem because of the lack of insurance, and in general, missing ‘risk’ markets: even 
with risk aversion, risk does not need to have detrimental consequences, since people 
can spend a little money to protect themselves if things go wrong. It becomes an 
important problem – with possibly disastrous consequences – if people do not have 
access to the means to protect themselves. In other words, it is a problem that should 
concern any policy maker when they lack the opportunities to choose a particular 
degree of protection, in line with their preferences.  
 
2.2 Identifying risk 
 
Since the analysis starts with risk, at least as important is how to narrow down which 
sources of risk one should focus with. Most of the work on risk and its consequences 
has  a  stylised  example  of  a  rural  households,  extensively  engaged  in  agriculture, 
mostly crops and at least some livestock. The risk envisaged is related to climate, and 
if a shock is identified, it is a drought. There are of course good reasons to do so, 
given  that  most  poor  people  in  the  world  live  in  rural  areas.  Furthermore,  when 
researching which shocks affect people in recent times, drought risk features highly. 
Table 1 gives a recent update on this from rural Ethiopia. Drought features highly, 
family illness and death is the next category.  
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Table  1: The incidence of serious shocks 1999-2004 in rural Ethiopia 
Type  of  shocks  households  reported  to  be  affected  by,  leading  to 
serious loss of assets, income or consumption, of those affected by a 
shock (note: 95 percent of households reporting such a shock) 
Percentage 
Drought  46.8 
Death of head, spouse or another person  42.7 
Illness of head, spouse or another person   28.1 
Inability to sell outputs or decreases in output prices  14.5 
Pests or diseases that affected crops  13.8 
Crime  12.7 
Difficulty in obtaining inputs or increases in input prices  11.3 
Policy/political  shocks  (land  redistribution, state  confiscation of assets, 
resettlement, forced contributions or arbitrary taxation) 
7.4 
Pests or diseases that affected livestock  7.0 
Source: Ethiopian Rural Household Survey, 2004, and Dercon, Hoddinott and Woldehanna (2005). 
Based on recorded three worst shocks per household, leading to serious loss of income, consumption or 
assets. 95 percent of households report at least one serious shock.  
 
 
But, for once looking very critically at these data, a few points should be emphasised. 
Investigating shock realisations is not the same as identifying the perceived risk faced 
by people. This is not as obvious a point. The more recent psychological literature on 
risk (confirmed by the behavioural work by Kahnemann and others) has focused on 
the fact that low probability events are given a much higher weight by people than 
objective risk assessments would give. So, even though ‘political risks’ or ‘crime’ 
may feature relatively lower in terms of realisations, responses in terms of their ex-
ante behaviour to certain risks may be more substantial than may seem objectively 
warranted. For example, if a rational response to the risk of arbitrary taxation (e.g. the 
sudden introduction of extra local taxes, rather common during the 1980s) is to keep 
more assets liquid, then overestimating this risk may result in substantial untapped 
resources  for  self-improvement.  This  effect  may  possibly  be  more  important  than 
responses to other more ‘normal’ risks. At present, there is no evidence on this. 
 
Another issue is that similar lists as in table 1 do not exist for other, increasingly more 
important  settings  such  as  those  facing  urban  households  or  recent  migrants.  Of 
course, for  some  risks they  may  be  easily  collected  – for  example formal  labour 
market  risks  of  unemployment  –  but  in  general  these lists  are  best at  picking  up 
simply identifiable shocks. Or increasing ‘social risks’ – risks that may imply that 
people  fear  that  they  will  not  boycotted  in  their  activities  by  their  local  society, 
affecting  their  willingness  to  take  on  activities.  And  possibly  most  important:  if 
people adjust their activities to deal with risk, the risks that will actually affect them 
are endogenously chosen from all the risk they could have faced: if typically once a 
week the electricity goes off for a few hours, then investing in selling ice cream may 
not be a good idea at all, removing profitable ice-cream production from the portfolio 
possibilities. 
 
A  related  challenge  involves  finding  ways  of  introducing  risk  that  is  relatively 
common to all people in a particular context (a region, a country) in analysis, but that 
is  nevertheless  likely  to  be  crucial.  Macro-work,  comparing  different  countries, 
typically can do  this, and this explains that if risk  is introduced  in macro-growth QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 9 
 
analysis,  they  can  focus  on  important  ‘institutional’  risks,  such  as  the  ‘risks  of 
expropriation’,  ‘lack  of  rule  of  law’,  or  ‘conflict’.  Similarly,  general  economic 
insecurity is difficult to identify as well. Furthermore, some of the risks that economic 
analysis has emphasized, such as tenure insecurity and other property rights issues, 
are poorly picked up (with some exceptions). Empirical micro work needs to find 
ways of introducing these relevant risks more into the analysis. 
 
Surely, there is no easy solution and many people have recognised the need to collect 
better data to get at ‘risk distributions’ faced by households and firms. Many studies 
use rules of thumb or econometric techniques– but are they really satisfactory? Some 
survey instruments have been used to elicit these and even focus group techniques 
have  been  applied,  but  there  has  not  been  a  systematic  review  of  these  –  which 
techniques  work,  where,  why?  Contrasting  subjective  perceptions  of  risk  and 
objective realisations should be part of this work. 
 
2.3 The behavioural challenge 
 
In this section – standing slightly separate from the broad sequence of sections and 
sub-sections in this paper – I want to briefly raise some difficult questions related to 
our  conceptual  understanding,  more  specifically  by  briefly  drawing  on  recent 
developments in economics, most notably behavioural economics. This is branch of 
economics,  with  inspiration  from  psychology,  trying  to  investigate  and  take  into 
account behaviour as it appears to take place, even if not quite consistent with the 
rational  choice  framework  more  usually  applied  in  economics.  Behavioural 
economics is on the ascent and further work on risk cannot just ignore this. Most 
researchers  working  on  risk  and  its  implications  for  poverty  and  growth  have 
generally ignored this work. Formal modelling tends to be based on expected utility, 
explicitly identifying risk aversion in outcomes and/or wealth. The challenges posed 
by the behavioural evidence are not taking into account. Let me make a caricature of 
much of this work. “If we cannot explain it easily, let’s redraw the utility function to 
fit the evidence.” Some complicated discounting, discontinuous functions, fanning out 
of low probabilities and other ‘tricks’ can be applied. There are excellent reasons why 
one should not necessarily go in the direction: it redirects the focus of many observed 
outcomes back into the sphere of preferences, drawing attention away from the bread 
and  butter  of  the  economist,  focusing  on  how  constraints  shape  behaviour  and 
outcome.  Arguably,  when  dealing  with  risk  and  poverty,  preferences  are  not  the 
sphere we should start work: risk fundamentally only matters for behaviour because 
insurance markets fail, and it matters only a great deal for poverty because the lack of 
insurance and other mechanisms to deal with it imply ex-ante ex-post strategies and 
particular poverty and growth outcomes. It took a lot of work and effort of researchers 
to  elucidate how the role of  different market  failures means that simply reducing 
observed behaviour to ‘risk aversion’ on the part of the poor is misleading. As Kochar 
(1995) notes, “the set of options faced by farmers offers little role for preferences” (p. 
159). The behaviour of the poor with few insurance possibilities may look as if they 
have more (innate) risk-averse preferences, but it is the lack of insurance and credit, 
and the set of options available to them that forces them to take less risk and therefore 
forego income (see Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989, for a careful theoretical discussion).
4   
                                                
4 A possible source of confusion in the literature is the concept of ‘asset integration’ (see for example, 
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981), arguing that risk preferences should be measured relative to final wealth 
levels. With imperfect credit and insurance markets, wealth is a constraint in the choice set and other QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 10 
 
 
Even if much of the emerging behavioural literature may seem opportunistic, one 
cannot just ignore it, in order to focus rightful attention to the policy implications of 
failing markets for the poor. Not least since the work on risk is probably the best 
established of all work on behavioural economics. Three strands can be mentioned, 
which despite suggestions to the contrary in most writings on behavioural economics, 
are not easily squared in a general theory of behaviour towards risk, let alone a clear 
representation of preferences. First, loss aversion: people may well have a calculus 
focusing on losses, so that at any point of wealth, a loss is much more heavily valued 
than a gain. Secondly, as mentioned before, a relatively higher weight is attached to 
low probability events. Thirdly, when comparing two losses, risk loving behaviour 
may  apply  to  the  larger  losses.  More  specifically,  if  there  is  a  choice  between  a 
moderate  loss  with  certainty,  and  a  far  greater  loss  with  some  large  non-zero 
probability and a small probability to make only a small loss, in experiments, people 
mostly choose the latter option: they hold on to the hope that they may not lose very 
much, even if with small probability, even though the expected outcome could be a 
very serious loss. 
 
Loss aversion is probably best established and most widely accepted. Its dependence 
on a reference point is difficult to translate in normative analysis (i.e. what to do about 
it?).  But  it  does  not  have  to  undermine  most  of  the  existing  evidence  on  the 
importance of downside risk for people, not least for those who find it hard to protect 
themselves. The third issue, on risk seeking behaviour when faced with losses may 
well be relevant especially during crisis periods: for example, it is well recorded that 
during crises, such as the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia, farmers desperately held on to 
their  livestock,  rather  than  selling  in  time,  even  at  the  expense  of  many  of  their 
household members’ and their own life. The possibility of losing only little, however 
remote, may induce this risk-seeking behaviour.  
 
In any case, it would be good for research on risk, growth and poverty to link itself 
better with the emerging behavioural evidence, and not least push them also to think 
in terms of policy implications in risk related issues.  
 
2.4   A selected summary of the micro-evidence on risk as a cause of poverty
5 
 
There are at least three literatures on development issues that have long recognised 
that risk is an important factor, explaining levels of poverty and deprivation. It is 
helpful to briefly discuss them, and explain how they fit in with the more general 
issue of risk as a cause of poverty, as argued in this paper. The first is the fertility 
literature, where it is commonly argued that high infant and child mortality, i.e. the 
risk that children will not survive beyond a certain age, increases the fertility rate. 
Behind this view are more general arguments of the family-level benefits of more 
labour  or  old  age  security,  not  least  in  circumstances  of  limited  entitlement  to 
alternative  social  protection  measures,  and  even  though  it  often  puts  pressure  on 
women’s health and well-being, as well as causing e.g. some of the well-documented 
externalities on environment, land pressure and well-being of others (for a careful, 
balanced  discussion  on  these  issues,  see  Dasgupta  (1993)).  Note  that  this  is  an 
                                                                                                                                       
constraints could be entered in assessing the behaviour towards risk, but this is arguably different from 
assessing preferences, before constraints on choices are considered. 
5 This section draws on Dercon (2005). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 11 
 
example whereby the risk inherent in living conditions induces ‘ex-ante’ behavioural 
responses by households (effectively an over-investment in children), that may well 
divert resources from more profitable assets. 
 
A second literature is largely based on evidence from agricultural economics although 
is making a broader point, well-established in basic textbook economics. It focuses on 
preferences  towards  risk,  and  more  specifically  risk  aversion  (a  preference  trait, 
whereby people are willing to pay to avoid being faced with a risky choice, in favour 
of a less risky choice). Risk aversion will lead to profitable opportunities not to be 
taken up in favour of less risky choices with lower expected returns. There is wide 
evidence of behaviour consistent with risk aversion, and more importantly, of risk 
aversion  to  be  higher  when  expected  incomes  are  lower,  not  least  in  developing 
countries  (Newbery  and  Stiglitz  (1981),  Binswanger  (1981)).    It  leads  to  a  well-
established  view  that  the  ‘poor’  are  more  risk  averse,  and  this  will  contribute  to 
persistence in poverty, since they will not take the entrepreneurial risk required to 
enter into particular profitable activities.
6 While some of the points made have some 
link with this view, it will be argued that its emphasis on preferences is essentially 
misleading both as a complete theory of how risk causes poverty and as a guide to 
policy. 
 
A  third  literature  is  the  nutrition  literature,  whereby  poor  nutrition  in  particular 
periods  in  a  child’s  early  life  may  contribute  to  poorer  ‘long-term’  nutrition 
circumstances,  in  the  form  of  stunting  (height-for-age  levels  below  some  level 
observed in healthy populations).  Short-term shocks to nutrition may then contribute 
lower  nutritional  outcomes  in  the  long-run  as  well,  i.e.  a  persistent  health  effect. 
While there is evidence for this process, this is not exactly borne out by all studies: 
some have suggested that ‘catch-up’ remains possible: i.e. that over time children may 
recover the lost nutrition and return to their personal growth curve. Again, this is an 
empirical issue, and most evidence would suggest that stunting is a serious, permanent 
problem, not least in early years, since evidence suggests a strong correlation between 
child height at age three and adult height (Martorell, 1995, 1999).
7  
 
These nutritional effects may have far reaching consequences. Children with slow 
height  growth  are  found  to  perform  less  well  in  school,  score  poorly  on  tests  of 
cognitive functions and develop slower. Adult height is correlated with earnings and 
productivity, poorer cognitive outcomes and premature mortality due to increased risk 
of cardiovascular and obstructive lung disease. Taller women experience lower risks 
of child and maternal mortality. In the case of adults, an increasing body of evidence 
links adult weight or BMI
8 (the Body Mass Index, also known as the Quetelet Index) 
to agricultural productivity and wages (Dasgupta, 1993; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; 
Strauss  and  Thomas,  1998;  Pitt,  Rosenzweig  and  Hassan,  1990).  Low  BMI  is 
                                                
6 The fact that the expanding experimental literature on risk and preferences has questioned the validity 
of some of the underlying behavioural models for this analysis is not necessarily changing this view. 
Kahnemann and Tversky’s work has shown that ‘risk aversion’ may not be the appropriate concept, but 
instead that agents, at any level of income do not like losses, leading to a concept of ‘loss aversion’. 
Ideas of ‘safety-first’, while seemingly not consistent with most experimental evidence, would also 
entail preference-led persistence in poverty. 
7 The discussion of the evidence is based on Dercon and Hoddinott (2004). 
8 BMI is the Body Mass Index, defined as weight in kg, divided by the square of height in meters.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 12 
 
correlated with a large number of health-related indicators, including early onset of 
chronic conditions and increased risk of premature mortality (North, 1999).  
 
Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2004) trace the impact of the 1982/83/84 droughts 
in Zimbabwe, as well as exposure to the civil war preceding independence, on longer-
term measures of child health and education in the 1990s in a rich panel data set in 
particular resettlement areas. They focus on shocks if the child is in the critical 12-24 
month age category – generally recognised as the most critical time for child growth. 
These children were interviewed again 13 to 16 years later. Using an instrumental 
variables-maternal fixed effects estimator, they show that lowered stature as a pre-
schooler leads to lowered in late adolescence as well as delays in school enrollment 
and reductions in grade completion. The magnitudes of these impacts are meaningful. 
Using  careful  estimation  methods,  they  found  that  the  1982/83/84  drought  shock 
resulted in a loss of stature of 2.3 centimetres, 0.4 grades of schooling, and a delay in 
starting school of 3.7 months for this particular age-group. Using the values for the 
returns to education and age/job experience in the Zimbabwean manufacturing sector 
provided by Bigsten et al. (2000, Table 5), the impact of the shock translates into a 7 
per cent loss in lifetime earnings. 
 
These  permanent  effects  from  effectively  transitory  events  are  not  restricted  to 
nutrition or health. Lack of insurance and credit markets implies that recovery of 
assets lost to cope with a crisis or destroyed by it will not be straightforward and 
immediate. For example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) show that bullocks are one 
of  the  mechanisms  used  to  cope  with  shocks  in  their  rural  South  Indian  setting, 
resulting in sub-optimal levels of capital goods. These effects are also not restricted to 
physical capital: for example, studies in India have found that negative income shocks 
caused households to withdraw children from schools. Even if children may later on 
return to school, this causes lower educational levels, affecting the children’s ability 
to build up a better life for themselves (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1995).  Recent work on 
Zambia has shown that teacher absenteeism, closely linked to illness shocks in the 
context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, reduces cognitive achievement by children, again 
affecting long-term outcomes (Das, Dercon, Habyarimana and Krishnan, 2004). 
 
This evidence would suggest processes in which incomes and levels of wellbeing are 
permanently affected by  transitory shocks. It is possible to conceptualise these as 
poverty traps
9, equilibrium levels of poverty from which there is no possible recovery 
without  ‘outside’  intervention.  One  mechanism  could  be  the  classic  nutrition-
productivity poverty trap (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986). It is well established that below 
some critical level nutritional level, no productive activity of any sort is possible. So if 
during a crisis, all assets are wiped out except for a person’s labour, and if the crisis 
also pushes the person’s nutritional status below this threshold, there is no hope of 
ever recovering using own productive means. Only a serious windfall, such as in the 
form of aid, could induce the person to climb out of poverty, provided it is sufficient 
to pass the threshold value of nutritional status. While the evidence for this to be a 
                                                
9A poverty trap can be defined as an equilibrium outcome and a situation from which one cannot 
emerge without outside help, for example, via a positive windfall to a particular group, such as by 
redistribution or aid, or via a fundamental change in the functioning of markets. Poverty traps are often 
conceptualised  as  caused  by  the  presence  of  increasing  returns,  or  a  threshold,  although  other 
mechanisms are possible, such as credit market failures or externalities. Dercon (2004) has a review of 
models relevant for poverty analysis, as has Barrett (2004).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 13 
 
direct description of actual poverty traps is limited, it provides a useful narrative for 
more general poverty traps: there may be thresholds in some productive assets, which, 
if pushed below them, there is no possible recovery, but rather an equilibrium level of 
very low asset holdings and poverty. Barrett and Carter (2004) use evidence from 
Kenya to suggest that such thresholds can be observed at least among pastoralists, 
given that minimum herd size are required for possible accumulation and leading to 
‘asset poverty traps’.  
 
The  existence  of  poverty  traps  has  been  tested  more  directly  by  Ravallion  and 
Lokshin  (2000)  and  Jalan  and  Ravallion  (2004)  for  Bulgaria  and  China.  Most 
interestingly, they find no evidence of poverty traps, but in any case, of relatively long 
persistence of the effects on shocks: it takes many years for them to recover, and the 
recovery was longer for the poor. Their method exploited the insight that transition 
paths of incomes or consumption, when poverty traps exist, would be non-linear and 
allowing for multiple equilibria. Another way of looking at whether there is evidence 
of long-lasting effects from shocks was used by Dercon (2004), using a subset of the 
the same panel data households reported in tables 1 to 3.
10  
 
In  this  paper,  detailed  data  were  exploited  on  the  experience  during  the  1984/85 
famine, more specifically the extent they had to resort to famine coping strategies, 
such  as  cutting  meals  and  portions,  selling  valuables,  relying  on  wild  foods  and 
moving to feeding camps. An index of these experiences in the mid-1980s was then 
introduced  in a model of consumption  growth  based  on data from 1989 to 1997, 
regressing changes in food consumption on initial levels of food consumption at the 
household and community level and a number of common and idiosyncratic shocks. 
Note that if shocks only have transitory effects, then lagged shocks should have no 
effect. However, it was found that rainfall shocks several years before the period in 
which growth was measured, still affect growth. Most strikingly, the extent of the 
famine impact, as measured by the index of severity of coping strategies, strongly 
affected growth in the 1990s. This growth impact was substantial: depending on the 
estimation method, comparing the 25th and 75 percentile of households in terms of 
the severity of suffering, the latter had about 4 to 16 percentage points lower growth 
in the 1990s, a period of on average substantial recovery of food consumption and 
nutrition levels after crisis and war in the 1980s. Furthermore, it took on average ten 
years for livestock holdings, a key form of savings and assets for accumulation in 
rural Ethiopia, to recover to the levels seen before the 1984-85 famine. 
                                                
10 This paper did not allow for the non-linearities implied by multiple equilibria, as in more direct tests 
of poverty traps. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 14 
 
Table 2   Testing for persistent effects of shocks on food consumption growth. 
Dependent variable: change in ln food consumption per adult between survey waves 
(1989-94 and 1994-97). Hausman-Taylor and Jalan and Ravallion estimators. 
￿ln food cons 
(1) (HT) 
￿ln food cons 
(2) (JR) 
 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
ln food consumptiont-1  -0.318  0.000  -0.204  0.000 
Village mean ln food const-1  0.211  0.000  0.135  0.004 
rainfall shockst  0.622  0.000  0.614  0.002 
rainfall shockst-1  0.069  0.016  0.195  0.013 
adult serious illness  -0.043  0.076  -0.053  0.064 
crop shock (-1 is worst)  -0.014  0.757  -0.217  0.041 
livestock  shock (-1 is worst)   -0.018  0.704  -0.009  0.910 
severity of famine impact  -0.116  0.079  -0.397  0.068 
Constant  0.519  0.000  0.920  0.071 
Number of observations  636  319 
Source: Dercon (2004), table 6. Regression (1) use the Hausman-Taylor model, and assume rainfall 
shocks,  livestock  shocks  and  crop  shocks  as  time-varying,  exogenous  variables,  and  demographic 
changes,  illness  shocks  and  lagged  consumption  at  household  and  village  level  as  time-varying 
endogenous variables. The index of the severity of the crisis experienced (coping index) was treated as 
time-invariant exogenous, as was (if applicable) whether there was a road available. As time-invariant 
exogenous variables and instruments, the presence of harvest failure during the famine period, the 
estimated percentage of households suffering in each village and the ln of livestock before the famine 
were used. Regression (2) uses the Jalan-Ravallion estimator (Jalan and Ravallion (2002)). 
 
In general, we have only limited evidence on persistent effects of shocks but this is 
largely related to the lack of data available for this purpose. Still, careful analysis of 
available evidence can typically also uncover some of these effects. An example is 
recent work on the longer-term impact of the Indonesian crisis in 1998. Suryahadi, 
Sumarto  and  Pritchett  (2003)  estimated  that  the  poverty  rate  more  than  doubled 
between the outset of the crisis and  its peak,  effectively one  year. The results in 
Thomas  et  al.  (2004)  suggested  that  there  was  some  disinvestment  in  schooling, 
particularly amongst the poorest households. Subsequently, GDP recovered fast, and 
positive growth was restored by 2000, and poverty may even have fallen between 
1997  and  2000  (Strauss  et  al.,  2004).  Lokshin  and  Ravallion  (2005)  argue 
nevertheless  that  this  hides  a  geographically  diverse  picture.  Using  a  series  of 
extensive cross-section data sets, they find that living standards in many districts are 
still affected by the shock, even five years after it began, and three years after the 
sharp recovery. They suggest that a majority of those living below the poverty line in 
2002  would  not  have  done  so  except  for  the  1998  crisis:  in  other  words,  they 
experience persistent poverty effects from the 1998 shock.  
 
All this evidence is related to a persistent or permanent effect from a shock, so that 
uninsured risk is a cause of poverty. There is also evidence of the other effect: that the 
mere presence of uninsured risk changes household behaviour in terms of investment 
and activity portfolios. The fertility example at the start of this section can be viewed 
in  this  way.  Beyond  the  fertility  example,  there  is  further  evidence  that  such 
behaviour may be directly linked to risk and be a cause of perpetuating poverty. In 
Morduch (1990), using the ICRISAT sample, it is shown that asset-poor households 
devote a larger share of land to safer traditional varieties of rice and castor than to 
riskier but  higher-return varieties.  Dercon (1996)  finds  that Tanzanian households 
with  limited liquid assets  (livestock) grow proportionately  more  sweet potatoes, a 
low-return, low-risk crop. A household with an average livestock holding allocates 20 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 15 
 
percent less of its land to sweet potatoes than a household with no liquid assets. The 
crop portfolio of the wealthiest quintile yields 25 percent more per adult than that of 
the poorest quintile. Choosing a less risky crop portfolio thus has substantial negative 
consequences for incomes. 
 
Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger  (1993)  suggest  that  the  portfolio  of  activities  (and 
investments)  in  the  ICRISAT  villages  is  affected  by  high  risk.  Increasing  the 
coefficient  of  variation  of  rainfall  timing  by  one  standard  deviation  reduces  farm 
profits  of the  poorest  quartile  by  35  percent;  for  the  richest  quartile  the  effect  is 
negligible.  Efficiency  is  affected,  and  the  average  incomes  of  the  poor  decline. 
Wealthier farmers are not affected and are therefore able to earn higher incomes. This 
phenomenon affects the wealth distribution: 54 percent of wealth is held by the top 20 
percent of households. Jalan and Ravallion (2001) cite other examples, focusing on 
both asset and activity portfolios, although their evidence is more mixed.  
 
In a careful  study, Elbers and Gunning (2003), use simulation based econometric 
methods  to  calibrate  a  growth  model  that  explicitly  accounts  for  risk  and  risk 
responses,  applied  to  panel  data  from  rural  Zimbabwe.  They  found  that  risk 
substantially reduces growth, reducing the capital stock (in the steady state) by more 
than  40  percent.  Two-thirds  of  this  loss  is  due  to  ex-ante  strategies  by  which 
households try to minimize the impact of risk, i.e. the build-up of livestock holdings 
to cope with consumption risk.  Dercon and Christiaensen (2005), using the same data 
set on Ethiopia discussed above, find a significant increase in fertiliser use if some 
insurance were to be offered against downside consumption risk, since when rains 
fail,  financial  returns  to  fertiliser  use  are  typically  very  low.    They  reach  this 
conclusion of finding significant sensitivity of fertiliser use to the predicted levels of 
consumption when rains were to fail, despite controlling for actual current levels of 
assets, so that the problem is not just a problem of seasonal credit or working capital. 
They  find  that  fertiliser  application  rates  would  increase  by  about  8  percent  if 
downside risk could be insured. 
 
In sum, there is increasing evidence that uninsured risk increases poverty, through ex-
ante behavioural responses, affecting activities, assets and technology choices, as well 
as through persistent and possibly permanent effects from transitory shocks via the 
loss of different types of assets. This clearly has important implications for the design 
of policies, putting policies to reduce risk and the vulnerability it entails at the core of 
poverty reduction efforts.  
 
2.5   Poverty and Risk - Do we really believe the evidence?  
 
As the previous section has shown, there is a small but growing microeconometric 
literature on risk as a cause of poverty. It focuses on (a) how shocks have long-term 
implications  due  to  losses  of  physical,  human  and  social  capital  and  (b)  how 
uninsured risk shapes behaviour resulting in low-return, low risk portfolios.  
 
But we should be conscious that this evidence base is still weak. On the first effect, 
very  long  term  panel  data  are  needed,  since  recall  questions  tend  in  general  too 
unreliable  evidence.  It  would  be  good  to  replicate  further  studies.  An  excellent 
example is the Hoddinott et al. study on Zimbabwe, referred to above, tracing the 
impact  from  a  shock  (in  1982/83/84),  through  childhood  nutrition,  educational QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 16 
 
achievement up to (an extrapolation) of earnings.  The ‘poverty trap’ work – including 
Barrett, Carter and, using very different methods, Ravallion and associates should also 
be further replicated (and is left for others to discuss). 
 
To conduct such work, a few important issues need to be addressed. First, the panel 
data need to be long term but also they need to pay particular attention to attrition, 
implying that tracing of families that have moved away is essential. This is not least 
important if migration is one way of coping with shocks, while not being able to 
migrate may also be a consequence of an inability to take risks. Secondly, one needs 
detailed data on the shocks and events that shape people’s lives. As mentioned before, 
getting a better understanding of the risks people face and the shocks experienced (for 
example as distinct from slow trends) is difficult but very important. 
 
But the insights gained can be very interesting. Below I report the first evidence from 
an elaborate long-term panel in Tanzania, in Kagera. The recent work involved an 
attempt to trace any individual interviewed during a four round household survey 
conducted in 1991-1994. It meant that all split-off households were traced, increasing 
the household sample size from about 750 to close to 3000. 94 percent of the ‘old’ 
households were found back, and 88 percent of the surviving individuals were traced 
in  the  region, around  Tanzania and  even  in  neighbouring  countries. We collected 
detailed data on the incidence of orphanhood in this area of high HIV prevalence, and 
investigated the long-term implications of becoming an orphan. Table 3 reports results 
from the sub-sample that reached adulthood (above 19 or older) by 2004, based on a 
sample  of  non-orphans  in  the  baseline  period  1991-94,  so  that  the  effects  are 
effectively irreversible for both height and (most likely) for education. We find that 
losing one’s mother during childhood reduces height at adulthood by about 2 cm, 
while orphans have about one less year of education than others.  






  Ln height  Years of schooling 
Mother died between ages 0-15  -0.011  -0.757 
  [1.87]*  [2.07]** 
     
Father died between ages 0-15  0.001  -0.366 
  [0.12]  [1.16] 
     
Number of observations   681  681 
Notes: OLS estimates with community fixed effects and robust standard errors.. “Reached adulthood” (n=902) restricts 
the full sample to those age 19 and older in 2004.  T-statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1 %. Includes controls for child characteristics (sex and age dummies), baseline characteristics 
(residing with mother and residing with father; household consumption, flooring material, age, years of education and 
sex of the household head). The height regressions include the height of the child at baseline and, when available, 
mother’s height from the baseline data. The schooling regressions include the years of education of the child and 




Similar  data  set  being  constructed  in  Ethiopia  and  India  (where  all  individuals 
interviewed in the old widely studied Village Level Studies of ICRISAT are currently 
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implications of shocks on livelihoods. Parallel work on other data sets should have 
real high returns. 
 
The  evidence  on  the  ex-ante  impact  of  risk  is  arguably  harder  to  compile.  The 
previous  section  lists  a  number  of  examples,  most  notably  Rosenzweig  and 
Binswanger  (1993)’s  evidence.  Arguably  it  is  methodologically  the  strongest 
evidence, but it is not contradicted  by work using other methods such  as Dercon 
(1996) on Tanzania or Elbers and Gunning (2003) on Zimbabwe (see also Elbers and 
Gunning’s background note for this study). But they all share one characteristic: the 
impact is calculated to be huge. For example, in the Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
case, offering a reduction in the variance of the consumption risk faced by the ‘poor’ 
to the level of the variance of the ‘rich’ would imply an increased return per dollar of 
assets owned of at least a quarter. To put it simply, protecting the poor as well as the 
rich  can  protect  themselves  would  make  yearly  income  of  the  poor  jump  up  25 
percent. We need much more evidence on this because if these results are robust, then 
they are huge, and would provide a massive vindication of more activities in this area! 
The  problems  with  such  work  should  not  be underestimated.  The  key  issue  is  to 
identify the consumption (or other outcome) risk that households would face when 
taking on different portfolios. This typically will involve counterfactual simulation in 
one way or another.
11 
 
3. From micro to macro-evidence: does risk matter for growth? 
 
3.1 Micro-level poverty traps 
 
The arguments above are suggestive of general arguments of ‘poverty traps’ – 
situations whereby even if the household does as well as it can, whoever hard it tries, 
it cannot escape from poverty. Households lose different forms of capital (financial 
and physical, human, social capital) due to shocks, while ‘ex-ante’ behaviour trying to 
avoid even more harsh conditions results in livelihoods (in terms of activity and asset 
portfolios) that will have to choose lower risk at the expense of lower returns. We 
should nevertheless be careful to call this immediately a “poverty trap” – and we 
return to this below..  
 
                                                
11 In one recent paper, we tried to solve this in a particular way. In Dercon and Christiaensen 
(2005), we tried to estimate the impact of potential downside risk in consumption on the 
demand for fertiliser. This is in a context of widespread seasonal credit availability. Still, to 
control for working capital constraints, the model controls for liquid assets, as well as land 
and labour endowments. The trick was to first model consumption changes (using panel data) 
as a function of, inter alia, shocks, such as rainfall, interacted by variables, such as wealth 
variables, to reflect differential ability to cope ex-post. Then, using historical distributions of 
shocks  (say,  the  rainfall  distribution),  we  simulate  the  counterfactual  distribution  of 
consumption and generate values if rains were to fail. Assuming rational expectations, and 
entering the counterfactual log consumption levels into the fertiliser adoption equation. We 
find  strongly  significant  effects  of  this  ‘counterfactual’  downside  risk-related  level  of 
consumption, controlling for working capital, using a fixed effects logit (for the adoption 
decision) and random effects tobit model on application rates. The impact of risk is shown to 
be quantitatively important: being able to avoid downside risk in consumption would result in 
8 percent higher application rates for those using fertiliser in the sample. 
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There are three types of ‘market failures’ that, combined with some non-convexities 
or  thresholds,  have  been  shown  to  lead  to  poverty  traps  (Dercon  (2003)  has  an 
overview). The first one related to credit market failures. Here, the combination of 
thresholds plus the impossibility of credit for some people means that (in particular 
circumstances) the equilibrium configurations implies certain people not being able to 
get out of poverty despite their best efforts. The second relates to externalities, for 
example ‘spatial externalities’. In these models, when no movement between areas is 
possible, just the mere fact that one lives in a particular area results in external effects 
so that despite  your best  efforts you  would (together  with the others  in the area) 
remain  trapped  in  poverty.  These  externalities  could  be  related  ‘neighbourhood 
effects’, so that, for example, markets cannot be developed or human capital is not 
worth accumulating.  
 
The third group of poverty trap models relates to risk. There is one class of models 
that  is  quite  widely  developed.  They  relate  to  thresholds,  whereby  a  particular 
threshold needs to be passed (an area of increasing returns could do the trick as well). 
Examples are Banerjee and Newman (1993, 1995) and some of the more informal 
asset poverty trap models. They typically assume thresholds, and some other market 
failure, usually related to credit market failures. ‘Shocks’ enter in the narrative of the 
model, as the force that may push households below the threshold and towards a low 
income equilibrium, and indeed that may make people escape. However, risk has a 
surprisingly  limited  role  to  play  in  these  models:  if  anything,  risk-neutrality  is 
assumed and no behavioural response is effectively modelled. In fact, this is a rather 
more general result: if we only allow for ‘shocks’ to which no behavioural response is 
possible, these models suggest that it could be relatively easy to fall into the trap, but 
because of the interaction of thresholds and market failures, it would be very hard to 
escape. But shocks could still make you escape.
12 My reading of the work by Barrett 
and Carter (2005 and other contributions) is in this spirit: behavioural responses to 
risk are not explicitly modelled. Still, they are of course very suggestive of possible 
processes of impoverishment and poverty traps. 
 
Other models do introduce risk behaviour (of the ex-ante behaviour outlined), beyond 
the effects. But typically, risk preferences (i.e. that risk aversion reduces with wealth) 
typically are necessary to introduce something like a poverty trap. Banerjee (2005) is 
an example: some households settle for low return activities to reduce their exposure 
to risk. The emphasis on risk preferences as the route of a poverty traps is somewhat 
unsatisfactory, so we should realise that even in the ‘theoretical’ development there 
are some more gaps to clarify how risk and poverty may interact. I am aware of 
current work that tries to remove some of these restrictive preference assumptions to 
show the presence of poverty traps. 
 
There is therefore still much scope for elucidating the exact role of risk in poverty trap 
processes, accounting for behavioural responses towards risk. Some may consider this 
work too theoretical and abstract. But one should not underestimate the role of theory 
to provide the narrative to take to data. 
 
                                                
12 This leads to a surprising result: once there is the possibility of positive shocks, and if they can be 
large enough, then there will always be a few lucky ones that can escape. Strictly speaking, there is no 
‘poverty trap’ in which no-one can ever escape without outside policy intervention. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS148   Page 19 
 
In practice, we should also be careful to just conclude from empirical work that 
poverty traps are there. Observed long term poverty or other phenomena suggesting 
that low incomes are being earned for long periods of time is not the same as showing  
that there are poverty traps. A first reason for caution is that we may ‘just’ be 
observing a situation of ‘poverty persistence’: poverty that lasts for long periods of 
time but from which own effort can allow an escape in due course. For example, one 
could slowly save enough to build up enough savings to handle shocks, and then start 
engaging into more risky, profitable activities.  
 
Against this comment, it can be very reasonably argued that long-term persistence and 
poverty traps may in practice result in very similar dismal living conditions: the 
knowledge that you or some generation of your family in the future may escape 
poverty after many years of harsh conditions offers little solace to a poor family. The 
distinction between a poverty trap and poverty persistence is then academic. 
Nevertheless, it is likely to have implications for the design of policies – and more 
work on this is definitely needed.  
 
A second reason for caution is that a poverty trap typically requires more than just 
‘uninsured  risk’.  I  also  think  that  it  is  more  complicated  conceptually  than  some 
recent writings have tried to suggest. But it may help briefly to suggest ways in which 
risk tends to be treated in the poverty trap literature. Essentially, I like the distinction 
made by two of the foremost theorists on poverty traps, Ray and Mookherjee. The 
theoretically best understood models of poverty traps, but, in my view, possibly least 
useful ones are related to pure coordination failure: multiple equilibria exist, but the 
combination of market failures (such as the inability to make enforceable contracts 
with side payments) and certain ‘expectations’ may make one isolated group settle for 
a low outcome equilibrium, while another unrelated group settles for a high outcome 
equilibrium.  In  a  simple  sense,  any  ‘shock’  could  make  a  group  shift  to  another 
equilibrium – but it is not a ‘shock’ as we know it from talking about risk, but an 
‘expectations’ shock. Understanding this intuitively is not self-evident (maybe ask a 
game theorist – and they will give you a long explanations related to ‘shared beliefs’ 
or even ‘culture’), but I take it that the ‘theory’ of how such shocks may function and 
how  another  equilibrium  may  materialise  is  surely  not  simply  translated  into  a 
straightforward policy message. It is not a world in which ‘risk’ really features, and 
‘shocks’ are just a term unrelated to risk. 
 
The other form of poverty traps – much more familiar from policy analysis, and most 
relevant for our purposes – is the world of ‘history-dependent’ multiple equilibria. 
Here,  some  unstable  equilibria  may  exist, for  example  due to  what is  technically 
called “nonconvexities” in technology or preferences, linked to increasing returns or 
similar  behaviour  linked  to  threshold  effects.  The  simplest  example  of  such  a 
“nonconvexity” is the presence of some fixed ‘threshold’ that needs to be overcome to 
obtain access to a higher source of earnings: in order to go to another livelihood path, 
one has to be able to get over a short but steep hill, for example in terms of assets. 
Households with  particular configurations  of  assets and characteristics, just  at  the 
bottom of the hill, may be attracted to one particular stable but low-level equilibrium, 
while another group, with slightly but not much better configuration (who happen to 
be on top of the hill) may end up in a much higher equilibrium. Furthermore, a shock 
(that  households  cannot  cope  with  and  with  real  impact)  may  then  make  some 
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another, ‘bad’ one: they are pushed just past the hill top, sliding down quickly to the 
bottom. 
 
This type of model is clearly not a simple configuration in which anyone poor is in a 
poverty trap. For example, simply stating that poor people are trapped in poverty 
because they have low endowments is not quite the same as ‘they face a poverty trap’ 
in a more puritan, but conceptually correct usage of the term. Being ‘asset poor’ does 
not have to mean a poverty trap – it is just being very poor. It helps to keep the term 
‘trap’ reserved to the more complicated, but plausible very relevant processes related 
to  thresholds  and  nonconvexities  or  other  sources  of  multiple  equilibria,  such  as 
particular configurations of market failures.  A poverty trap exists if no amount of 
effort of the person trapped can get him or her out.  
 
Of course, much policy rhetoric uses the term ‘poverty trap’ to referring to some 
process of conditional convergence, whereby one group may converge to one steady 
state and another, with other current (‘initial’) characteristics, to another. I doubt there 
is much mileage to be had from applying the poverty trap rhetoric to such a context, 
not least when discussing risk and shocks. The reason is that it may be rather ‘easy’ to 
go the other path: just patiently saving to go the higher path (in other words, people 
can climb out on their own accord), or just offering a small transfer can get them out 
(say,  a  small  loan  or  a  literacy  course).  Poverty  traps  relate  to  seriously  high 
thresholds that have to be overcome:  
 
There is another problem with the poverty trap rethoric. Thresholds may have to be 
defined in different spaces. In most simple analysis, the threshold tends to be defined 
in a unidimensional ‘asset’ space. Transfer programmes offering enough cash to buy 
this ‘asset’ level would then be enough to overcome the trap. This assumes enormous 
fungibility in the asset space, which in the short run is unlikely to exist. Suppose you 
need particular minimum combinations of assets to overcome a poverty ‘trap’: for 
example, the threshold consists of a plot of fertile land, a pair of oxen, basic education 
and  good  health.  In  technical  terms,  this  is  referred  to  the  problem  of 
complementarities,  first  highlighted  in  the  first  contributions  on  poverty  traps  by 
Rodan-Rosenstein. In a world of poverty traps, offering a pair of oxen to a household 
also  lacking basic education and  good health  is the a waste of money:  given  the 
threshold, it would be predicted that the pair of oxen is just wasted, since it can only 
lift people above the threshold if the other conditions are satisfied. Since building up 
human capital in the form of health and education takes time, we are faced with a 
fundamental coordination problem – and a rather depressing message: offering land 
and oxen now may just not be enough to lift anyone out of the trap. 
 
 
3.2. From micro-level poverty traps to macro-growth impacts 
 
How  important  are  these  micro-linkages  between  risk,  poverty  and  growth  in 
macroeconomic terms? Does it really affect overall growth? This is at present the 
hardest question to answer. It is correct to state that we have evidence that risk results 
in inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, with lower accumulation of human, 
financial  or  physical  capital  as  a  consequence.  Furthermore,  because  underlying 
starting levels of wealth are correlated to with ability to cope ex-post with shocks, the 
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The micro-evidence above suggest that the earnings lost due to the ex-ante and ex-
post effects of risk are substantial, reducing growth for those affected. If many people 
are affected, then these may well add up to substantial sums with serious implications 
for the long run growth rate. For example, as the discussion above had suggested, the 
losses in the Ethiopian economy from the 1984-85 famine or the losses in Zimbabwe 
or at least in specific areas due to drought and other shocks in the early 1980s would 
appear substantial enough to expect macroeconomic effects.  
 
However,  it  is  far  from  established  that  these  effects  are  really  substantial  in 
macroeconomic terms. A key reason is that relatively little work exists that tries to 
investigate  this.  As  a  microeconomist  working  on  the  topic  of  risk,  growth  and 
poverty, the macro-growth evidence is a very disappointing. There does not seem to 
exist  a  good  treatment  of  the  impact  of  risk  on  growth,  with  possibly  of  few 
interesting recent exceptions. A recent paper by Aghion et al. (2005) is possibly an 
exception.  They  provide  a  model  where  by  ex-post  liquidity  risk  by  firms  if  a 
recession  where  to  hit  leads  them  ex-ante  to  cut  back  investment,  implying 
‘persistent’ or at least ‘long-lasting’ effects. They also show, theoretically, that the 
degree of financial intermediation would affect how strong the growth impact would 
be. To my knowledge, this is the only paper that explicitly has a model of ex-ante risk 
strategies affecting behaviour, and levels and growth of outcomes at the macro level 
(see table 1). Interestingly, they link this model to the data, and introduce commodity 
price shocks (with some different lags) in a model explaining 5-year growth. While I 
am not entirely clear that they really pin down empirically that ‘risk’ is affecting 
growth (it still reads much like ‘shocks’ doing it), it is an interesting approach. There 
would be some mileage of trying to do this analysis with a data set more focused on 
the poorer countries and introducing other shocks (e.g. the recent cross-country data 
sets on rainfall) into the analysis. 
 
My own preference would be to introduce at least the idea  of ‘persistence’  as in 
Campbell and Mankiw, and used in Dercon (2004) to study microlevel growth in 
Ethiopia. The idea is testing whether shocks occurring at t-1 do not just affect growth 
during t-1 to t, but also t and t+1, then shocks have ‘persistent’ growth effects. More 
specifically,  if  shocks  only  have  transitory  effects  (the  usual  assumption  in  the 
empirical growth literature, and seemingly also for most of the analysis in Aghion et 
al. 2005), then lagged shocks should have no effect. However, as discussed before, in 
Ethiopia, it was found that rainfall shocks several years before the period in which 
growth was measured and indeed the serious drought and famine of the 1980s, still 
affect growth.  
 
A second approach would be to expand the Ramey and Ramey (1993) analysis on the 
impact of commodity price risk (measured by the country-specific standard deviation 
of commodity prices in a time series) to include shocks more relevant for developing 
countries. Aghion et al (2005) also re-test their relationship, and allowing for the 
degree  of  financial  intermediation,  and  could  provide  a  further  basis  for  more 
analysis. 
 
Another issue should also be realised and possibly be exploited. To some extent, the 
growth literature has gone further than the micro-literature I am more familiar with. 
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the literature on conflict and risk of civil strife or war, and the literature on issues of 
risk of appropriation and other property rights issues. Although little of the underlying 
analysis is properly dealing with risk, there are insights and evidence that could be 
fruitfully put together and contrasted with the evidence on other sources of risk. (Note 
that the microeconomic equivalent  of this  literature on  property  rights,  looking  at 
tenure insecurity and other property rights issue should also be placed much more 
directly into the literature on risk, poverty and growth.
13)  
 
But finally, some words of warning is in order. First, there is an emerging literature on 
‘macroeconomic’ poverty and growth traps (e.g. Quah, Agenor). While interesting, 
the  microfoundations  of  this  literature  cannot  easily  be  found  in  the  literature  on 
poverty traps quoted above, especially those related to problems of the credit markets 
or the presence of risk. The reason is that the macro-literature models effectively a 
representative agent, while the micro-literature (in theory and evidence) clearly shows 
that  different  agents  (not  least  the  initially  wealthy  versus  the  initially  poor)  are 
differentially affected by the market failures, so that the poor are forced to be much 
more inefficient than others. Differential marginal returns or differential total factor 
productivities is definitely not consistent with a representative agent model. In short, 
the theoretical basis of some of this macro-work is not based on strong foundations 
nested in micro-theory and evidence. 
 
Secondly, the micro-evidence quoted before is devoid of general equilibrium effects. 
The issue is that markets and incentives to others may adjust if some are faced with a 
micro-level poverty trap. Generating a poverty trap in general equilibrium is quite 
different from generating in a micro, partial equilibrium sense. Furthermore, while 
poverty traps may imply that even the best effort of the person trapped will not get 
him or her out, they may be unravelled by changes in other parts of the economy. 





This  paper  had  three  objectives:  first,  it  aims  to  take  stock  of  the  nature  of  the 
evidence available and on the links between uninsured risk and shocks on the one 
hand, and growth and poverty on the other, both at a macro and micro level. The 
conclusion is that we have some micro-evidence on a strong impact of uninsured risk 
and shocks on poverty and growth at the micro-level. However, the macro-evidence is 
far weaker. We make the case for more work and especially quantifying its relevance 
in macro-terms. Secondly, we aimed to show some areas in which work is needed. 
The macro-dimension is one, but we are still lacking much systematic evidence on the 
relevance  of  ‘ex-ante’  impact  of  risk  on  activities  and  portfolios.  Linking  the 
emerging evidence from behavioural economics to this literature is also a challenge. 
For policy makers (in line with the third objective), it is important to realize that the 
current  ‘macro’  evidence  is  not  as  strong  as  the  micro-evidence.  Since 
macroeconomic evidence involves general equilibrium and scale effects, caution in 
jumping to conclusions is clearly necessary. In other words, we may observe long-
term  impacts  of  risk  and  shocks  in  micro-data,  whether  this  means  that  they  are 
                                                
13 For example, recent evidence from Ethiopia in Ayalew, Dercon and Gautam (2005) suggests that 
trying to move perceptions of land tenure insecurity from 59 percent with secure rights to 100 percent 
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sufficiently important in the context of the macroeconomy, or even in the context of 
the ability of growth to deliver poverty reduction, is still to be researched. 
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